The Islamic State’s (IS) territorial demise in Syria is now inevitable. IS fighters have started to flee, leaving them scattered around Syria and Iraq. There are also returning fighters, set to return to what they once called home. Many of these went back to Europe – which has gained much attention. More of this is returning to North Africa, where IS could remobilise.
Adding to the Ranks
Many foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq come from the Maghreb and the Greater Sahara region. Among these countries, Tunisia and Libya have some of the highest rates of foreign fighters, with Tunisia having the highest rate per capita globally, with roughly 6000. One explanation for this is that the Arab Spring, which successfully toppled regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, implemented a mindset for many in which they now consider it their duty to overthrow illegitimate regimes and oppose unwelcome regimes. An Algerian regional jihadism researcher called them the modern Che Guevara’s.
Additionally, the region is considered prone to radicalization because of social grievances and exclusion, while Salafist-jihadist networks in the area have increased their reach since the Arab Spring. This poses two problems for the region: Dealing with the returning fighters and those who never left. Because the combination of the two can become a major security threat. Returning fighters can contribute to already existing networks and affiliates with their combat experience by teaching and training the already radicalized in the region. Returning fighters can further inspire those yet to take to arms within these networks.
Territory to Dominate
North Africa’s proneness to IS lies in the possible mobilisation of fighters in the region and the large power gaps. IS has exploited this before in Libya. However, Field Marshal Haftar drove them out of Sirte and the surrounding areas in 2016. Porous borders in the Sahara contribute to establishing lawless areas that militias and criminal groups can dominate.
Among these power vacuums are southern Libya, which remains ungoverned despite being ‘saved’ by Haftar recently, mainly in border regions. UN members have warned about IS’ determination to rebuild its capabilities in Libya. From these border regions, an organisation like IS can operate cross-border into western Egypt, where they struck in late 2018. By crossing the border to Sudan, IS could mobilise fighters from Darfur, where many fighters in Libya originated from. In the northwest, IS could reach Tunisia, which also contributed significantly with fighters in Libya, as well as in Iraq and Syria.
While right across the border, in Niger, is where the IS wilayah in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) is based. ISGS operates from Niger and across the border into Burkina Faso and Mali and from Mali into Mauritania. Libya also borders Chad, which hosts the Lake Chad basin, where IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) is their stronghold. Effectively, a group capable of exploiting these power gaps and controlling a large territory, which IS has proven capable of, could dominate the Sahara and its surroundings.
As such, returning IS fighters and the experience they bring back to North Africa can bring dangerous developments due to these very territorial gaps and socio-political discontent in the region, which has led people onto a radical path. The core of IS are aware of this too, as Northern African security officials have noted – IS has not disappeared, they have dispersed into Sahara and the Sahel.
